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A PATIENT'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE IS NOT
ALWAYS BLACK AND WHITE:
LONG TERM CARE FACILITY DISCRIMINATION
AND THE COLOR OF CARE
SARA GRONNINGSATERf
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, employers in the medical field have been confronted
with patients' requests to have a care provider of a specific race. Such
requests have put these care providers in a legal and ethical bind, balancing
the need to adhere to patient preferences while also protecting care
providers' rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Health
care employers that foster discriminatory practices by patients would
violate the rights of their employees under Title VII.2 Because there is no
way for a legal system to remain neutral to "preference formation," it is
completely legitimate for the government and the law to attempt to shape
t J.D. May 2012, St. John's University School of Law; Northeastern University B.S., summa cum
laude, 2008.
1 See Vida Foubister, Requests By Patients Can Put Doctors in Ethical Bind, AM. MED.
NEWS(2001), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/01/22/prsbO122.htm (noting that patients'
requests for a caregiver on the basis of race are quite common, but the medical field does not have a
policy set forth telling physicians how to handle such situations); Andis Robeznieks, Hospital
Apologizes For Complying With Racial Request, AM. MED. NEws(2003), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2003/10/27/prsbl027.htm (discussing an incident at a Philadelphia based hospital
where the hospital complied with a husband's request that only white hospital staff members care for
his pregnant wife).
2 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-(b) (2012) ("(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer -- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (b)
Employment agency practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency
to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of
his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on
the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
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these preferences through laws forbidding racial discrimination. 3 Title VII4
was enacted because it has long been believed that the achievement of
social justice and protection of employees from discrimination in the
workplace is valued higher than "free markets" or the "right" to choose
based on racial preferences. 5 On the contrary, "[t]he advent of the 'patients
rights' movement is a relatively recent phenomenon having first taken root
in the early 1990's."6 The Federal Nursing Home Reform Act ("OBRA
87") established a set of national standards which certified nursing facilities
must adhere to when dealing with patients' care and patients' rights.7
Giving patients some control over their care, OBRA 87 addressed "the
widespread and well-documented abuse and neglect of residents in
institutional care,"8 and legally permitted patients to choose their own care
providers. 9 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Center,10 held that the right to
choose a care provider under OBRA 87 excludes the right to choose based
on the race or ethnicity of a care provider.11
3 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, in FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 3-9, 151-63 (1997), reprinted in ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND
ECONOMICS 384, 387 (Emma Coleman Jordan & Angela P. Harris eds., 2005).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) ("(a) Employer Practices. It shall be unlawful employment
practices for an employer -- (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
5 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 389 ("Achievement of social justice is a higher value than the
protection of free markets; markets are mere instruments to be evaluated by their effects."); see
generally Norman C. Amaker, Quittin' Time?: The Antidiscrimination Principle of Title VII vs. The
Free Market, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 757 (1993) (discussing the need to balance antidiscrimination policies
within Title VII with the need to maintain a "free market").
6 Encyclopedia of Everyday Law, Patients Rights (2012), http://www.enotes.com/everyday-law-
encyclopedia/ patient-rights.
7 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (2012); Steven Peck, The 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act
Established Minimum Standards for Nursing Home Abuse and Neglect, CALIFORNIA ELDER LAW
ATTORNEY BLOG (Feb. 2, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://www.californiaelderlawattomeyblog.com/2010/02/the-1987-nursing-home-reform-a.html.
8 Leonila Vega, Court Says Right to Choose Providers Doesn't Include Race/Ethnicity, DIRECT
CARE ALLIANCE, INC. (Sept. 13, 2010, 3:36 PM),
http://blog.directcarealliance.org/2010/09/discrimination-versus-consumer-choice-understanding-
brenda-chaneys-case.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012) ("A skilled nursing facility must protect and promote the
rights of each resident, including ... [t]he right to choose a personal attending physician . . . ."); Angela
Snellenberger Quinn, Comment, Imposing Federal Criminal Liability on Nursing Homes: A Way of
Deterring Inadequate Health Care and Improving the Quality of Care Delivered?, 43 ST. LouIS U. L.J.
653, 659 n.62 (discussing the rights guaranteed to nursing home residents under OBRA 87, including
the "right to choose a personal attending physician").
10 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010).
11 See id. at 914; Charles Wilson, Ind Ruling Halts Caregiver Choices Based on Race,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38819864/ns/us-news-life
("Courts have held that patients can refuse to be treated by a caregiver of the opposite sex, citing
330
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Beyond the rigid legal boundaries implemented by Title VII, the Seventh
Circuit recognizes that there are remedial measures that long-term health
care facilities can take to avoid a similar situation as was faced in Chaney.
These measures, including the implementation of cultural competency
training and behavior contracts, will give care facilities some flexibility in
dealing with hostile patients while protecting their employees from overt
bigotry.
Brenda Chaney was a Certified Nursing Assistant ("CNA") who
committed herself to caring for others. Picture yourself in Chaney's shoes,
making the same commitment that she has made. You had spent nearly
five years caring for your ailing elderly mother, being at her bedside daily,
watching her health deteriorate, and seeing her take her last breath. Your
routine for the last five years has suddenly come to halt, and in the midst of
grieving you have a revelation that your passion and devotion for caring for
others did not have to end because of the passing of your mother; there
were others out there who could use that same tender care. You decide to
go back to school, after raising your own three children and having a
successful career as a paralegal, to get your nursing degree. You continue
to work full time as a paralegal and take night classes, and within a year
and a half, you become a CNA. The excitement of finding your true
passion is beyond words, and even more exciting is that you have landed
your dream job, caring for the elderly just as you did your mother. But
then, imagine everything crashing down around you, being referred to by
co-workers as the "black bitch" rather than by name, being secluded from
patients, and being reminded on a daily basis that you are different. Your
dreams fall to the wayside because of the one thing you cannot control: the
color of your skin.
This Comment focuses on the recent Seventh Circuit decision in Chaney
v. Plainfield Healthcare Center, and the dichotomy between patients' rights
and Title VII. This Comment asserts that Title VII trumps patients' rights
under OBRA 87 and that a long-term health care provider may not adhere
to the racial preferences of its residents under any circumstance. The
Supremacy Clause dictates that when state and federal law conflict, the
federal law will prevail. 12 This Comment examines the Seventh Circuit's
privacy issues. But the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, ruling in Chaney's case last month, said
applying that accommodation to race goes too far.").
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof . .. shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."); Chaney, 612 F.3d at 914 ("When two laws conflict, one state, one federal, the
Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal law prevails.") (emphasis in original).
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decision in Chaney, supporting the outcome, but discussing how the
opinion articulated is vague, and thus further analyzing options for long-
term care facilities confronted with a hostile resident like the one Chaney
faced. Part I of this Comment addresses the facts of the case and the
court's dispositions. Part II analyzes Title VII and establishes that a long
term care facility's policy that adheres to the racial preferences of its
residents violates employee's rights under Title VII, and any holding
inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit's decision renders Congress's intent
for enacting Title VII meaningless. Part II further highlights the fact that
race is not a bona fide occupation qualification exception ("BFOQ") under
Title VII. Part III examines the Supremacy Clause and explains that the
practices or policies set forth by Plainfield are unlawful employment
practices under federally mandated law, and further addresses why under
Title VII Plainfield cannot escape liability. Part IV takes a brief look at the
demographics of nursing homes and discusses the influence of the "baby
boomer" generation on racial disparities in nursing homes. Part V reviews
the ethical "dilemma" that care providers and facilities face and the
implications of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chaney. Lastly, Part VI
discusses and expands on the options available to health care providers who
find themselves in an ethical bind when patients make race-based care
requests, creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII
I. OVERVIEW: CHANEY V. PLANFIELD HEALTH CENTER
Brenda Chaney, a CNA, brought an action against Plainfield Healthcare
Center ("Plainfield") under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, claiming
"that Plainfield's practice of acceding to the racial biases of its residents is
illegal and created a hostile work environment."1 3 Chaney was hired by
Plainfield as a CNA and her duties included monitoring patients,
responding to individual patient requests, and assisting with their general
daily living needs.14 Chaney's daily assignments were noted on her shift
sheet,15 which listed the resident patients that Chaney would be responsible
for and their specific health care needs.16 One of Chaney's patients,
Majorie Latshaw, requested that she not be cared for by any black CNAs.
As a result, Plainfield specifically wrote "Prefers No Black CNAs" on
13 Chaney, 612 F.3d at 910. Chaney also brought an action for discriminatory discharge, which will
not be discussed in this Comment.
14 Id.
15 See id. (each employee received these shift sheets upon arriving at work each day).
16 Id.
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Chaney's daily assignment sheet. 17 Plainfield acknowledges to the court
that it has a "policy of honoring the racial preferences of its residents in
assigning health-care providers,"i 8 fearing that not adhering to the choices
of its patients would violate state and federal laws concerning patient's
rights. 19 Chaney, despite her reluctance, refrained from assisting Latshaw
and other similarly situated patients on her assignment sheet who had a
similar aversion for black CNAs.20 These race-based limitations took an
emotional toll on Chaney and often left her feeling depressed at the end of
her work shifts.21
Plainfield's practice of honoring the racial preferences of its patients not
only left Chaney feeling alienated by the fact that she could not assist
residents in her unit due to her race, but was further "accompanied by
racially-tinged comments and epithets from co-workers." 22 A white nurse
once called Chaney a "black bitch." Another time a white co-worker
looked at "Chaney and asked why Plainfield ' ... keep[s] on hiring all of
these black niggers?"' 23
Despite adhering to the patients' racial preferences and enduring abuse
from co-workers, Chaney was fired after only three months of work.24
Asserting her employment rights under Title VII against discrimination in
the workplace, Chaney brought an action against Plainfield in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. 25 The district
court granted summary judgment for Plainfield on Chaney's claim that
Plainfield policies led to a hostile work environment, as defined under Title
VII.26 Chaney and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. ("Plainfield maintains that it expected its employees to respect these racial preferences
because it otherwise risked violating state and federal laws that grant residents the right to choose its
providers . . . .").
20 Id. On one occasion, "Chaney found Latshaw on the ground, too weak to stand. Despite wanting
badly to help, Chaney had to search the building for a white CNA." Id. On another occasion, a patient
"refused Chaney's assitance in the shower, asking for a different nurse aide instead." Id
21 Id.
22 Id. at 911.
23 Id Many commentators have found this term to be offensive. See Randall Kennedy, A Note On
The Word "Nigger," http://www.civilwarliterature.com/01lntroduction/TheNWord.htm (last visited
Jan. 19, 2012).
24 Chaney, 612 F.3d at 911. Chaney alleged that at her post-termination hearing Plainfield told her
they fired her because she used the word "shitting" in front of a resident, but gave her no other grounds
for being fired. Id. However, at trial, Plainfield focused on other grounds for the discharge including,
"'bed alarm and call light infractions' and 'not doing a shift change."' Id.
25 Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., No. 1:08-CV-00071, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97215 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 29, 2009). Plainfield was also granted summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge
claim.
26 Id. at *19-20. Plainfield was also granted summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge
2012] 333
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("EEOC") appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 27 The Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment, finding that Chaney was faced
with a "racially hostile environment, and the evidence presented at
summary judgment allows a jury to conclude that Plainfield took
insufficient measures to address it."28
II. RACISM IN THE WORKPLACE: TITLE VII-HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
"Racism is the belief that characteristics and abilities can be attributed to
people simply on the basis of their race and that some racial groups are
superior to others."29 Discrimination in the workplace is not a foreign
concept, and as long as it continues to exist in "the framework" of society,
it will continue in the workplace.30 Although racism in the workplace exists
at all levels of the economic ladder, from blue-collar workers to white-
collar workers, 31 it is not always a public overt action. The United States
has made significant progress in overcoming racism in the workplace since
the Civil Rights movement and the enactment of Title VII, but the issue is
far from resolved. 32
A. Race Discrimination, Title VII Claims, and the EEOC
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it illegal "to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his . .. terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race." 33 One of the privileges of
claim. Id. at *28-29.
27 Chaney, 612 F.3d.
28 Id. at 915.
29 Anup Shah, Racism, GLOBAL ISSUES (Aug. 8, 2010),
http://www.globalissues.org/article/165/racism.
30 Knowledge Galaxy, Racism in the Workplace,
http://www.knowledgegalaxy.net/racism-intheworkplace/racism in the workplace.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Knowledge Galaxy]; see also Eve Tahmincioglu, Racial Harassment Still
Infecting the Workplace, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22575581/ns/business-careers/t/racial-
harassment-still-infecting-workplace (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
31 Knowledge Galaxy, supra note 30 ("Racism in the workplace exists on the level of white collar
employees as well as for blue collar workers."); see also Jennifer L. Pierce, "Racing for Innocence":
Whiteness, Corporate Culture, and the Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 26 QUALITATIVE
SOCIOLOGY 53, 55 (2003) ("Presumably, those with more education are less likely to rely upon
stereotypical beliefs. By contrast, my research focuses on highly educated, middle-class professionals -
lawyers - who, as I find, also display such behavior and attitudes.").
32 Knowledge Galaxy, supra note 30 (noting that the United States has made great bounds in
overcoming workplace racism but still has a long way to go); YWCA Central Alabama, Racial Justice,
http://www.ywcabham.org/Raciallindex.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012); Philip P. Frickey, John Minor Wisdom Lecture: Wisdom on
334
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employment is the right to work in a non-racially discriminatory
environment.34 "All workers, therefore, have a cognizable interest under
Title VII in discrimination against any race." 35 The United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for enforcing
federally mandated statutes such as Title VII.36 Title VII forbids
discrimination in any aspect of employment, including but not limited to
hiring and firing practices, promotions, pay, and job assignments. 37 Title
VII prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also "neutral job
policies that disproportionately exclude minorities and that are not job
related." 38
The EEOC guidelines have helped provide a framework as to race
discrimination in the workplace for lower courts, and have been quite
influential. 39 When evaluating employment decisions based on race or
color, courts, by analyzing the facts, determine whether the claim involves
disparate impact or disparate treatment.40 Disparate treatment involves
discrimination when race, as a protected trait, is the motivating factor with
regards to the treatment of employees. 4 1 Disparate impact discrimination is
present when there is a neutral policy or practice that has a negative impact
on a protected group and does not fit into the bona fide occupational
Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. I169, 1178-79 (2000).
34 MATTHEW BENDER & CO.4-21 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS P.21.22 (2010) [hereinafter CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE]; see also Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1096 (2d Cir. 1986)
("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that an employee has a right to a working
environment free of racial harassment.").
35 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE, supra note 34.
36 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Overview, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
37 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Race/Color Discrimination,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/race color.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) ("The law forbids
discrimination when it comes to any aspect of employment, including hiring, firing, pay, job
assignments, promotions, layoff, training, fringe benefits, and any other term or condition of
employment."); UNC Charlotte, Considering Legal Issues in Employment,
http://career.uncc.edu/students/effective-interviewing/considering-legal-issues-employment (last visited
Mar. 1, 2012).
38 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Facts About Race/Color Discrimination,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-race.cfm- (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
39 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Compliance Manual, Section 15: Race
and Color Discrimination, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html [hereinafter
Compliance Manual].
40 Scott H. Kremer, Comment: The Restructuring of Disparate Impact Analysis - Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 25 NEw ENG. L. REV. 959, 961 (1991); Compliance Manual, supra note 39, at
Section 15-V ("Race and color cases generally fall under one of two categories, depending on which
category most suits the facts - disparate treatment and disparate impact.").
41 Kremer, supra note 40, at 961; Compliance Manual, supra note 39, at Section 15-V ("Disparate
treatment discrimination occurs when race or another protected trait is a motivating factor in how an
individual is treated.").
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qualification exceptions ("BFOQ").42 Title VII does not allow racially
motivated policies "driven by business concerns" 43 or "the negative
reactions of clients or customers." 44
A plaintiff will only prevail in a Title VII hostile work environment
claim when he or she proves: "(1) that the work environment was both
subjectively and objectively offensive; (2) that the harassment was based
on membership in a protected class; (3) that the conduct was severe or
pervasive; and (4) that there is a basis for employer liability." 45
Furthermore, in O'Neal v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals of Illinois established three categories of materially adverse
employment actions under Title VII:
(1) cases in which the employee's compensation, fringe benefits, or
other financial terms of employment are diminished, including
termination; (2) cases in which a nominally lateral transfer with no
change in financial terms significantly reduces the employee's career
prospects by preventing her from using her skills and experience, so
that the skills are likely to atrophy and her career is likely to be
stunted; and (3) cases in which the employee is not moved to a
different job or the skill requirements of her present job altered, but
the conditions in which she works are changed in a way that subjects
her to a humiliating, degrading, unsafe, unhealthful, or otherwise
significantly negative alteration in her workplace environment. 46
If an employer's conduct fits within any one of these three categories a
litigant in the Seventh Circuit has a proper Title VII claim against that
employer. Chaney's claim fits in the third category, for she was not
permitted to care for those patients who specifically requested only white
CNAs, and she was humiliated because of her race by other white CNAs.
42 Kremer, supra note 40, at 962; Compliance Manual, supra note 39, at Section 15-V (discussing
the meaning of disparate impact).
43 See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (disparate treatment
liability "does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the
discrimination.").
44 See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Title VII is a
blanket prohibition of racial discrimination, rational and irrational alike, even more so than of other
forms of discrimination attacked in Title VII. . .. [Thus,] it is clearly forbidden by Title VII, to refuse
on racial grounds to hire someone because your customers or clientele do not like his race.").
45 Mendenhall v. Mueller Streamline Co., 419 F.3d 686, 691 (7th Cir. 2005).
46 O'Neal v. City of Chi., 392 F.3d 909,911 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth.,
315 F.3d 742, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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B. Judicial Interpretation and Legislative History Do Not Lead To The
Establishment ofRace Based Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Exception Under Title VII
Section 703(e) sets out exceptional circumstances in which
discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin is lawful. 47
Consequently, Congress and courts dealing with Title VII claims have
recognized various exceptions to unlawful discrimination practices under
Title VII. Employer, "as defined in Title VII excludes 'a bona fide private
membership club (other than a labor organization) that is exempt from
taxation under 50 1(c) of the Internal Revenue Code." 48 Also excluded from
the protection of Title VII's definition of employer and its ban on
employment discrimination are Indian Tribes.49 Moreover, Title VII
includes exceptions for state and local officials that are elected by qualified
voters, religious organizations that hire individuals on the basis of religion
if they are being hired to further the organization's religious activities,
aliens employed outside the United States, members of the Communist
Party, and employers engaged in national security in defined
circumstances. 50
47 Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer
for employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer
for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any
individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or
institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college,
university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious
corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other
educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular
religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012).
48 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE, supra note 34.
49 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) ("The term 'employer' . . . does not include . . . an Indian tribe.");
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE, supra note 34 (discussing that Indian tribes are not protected under
Title VII from employment discrimination because tribes generally control as well as operate their own
affairs and Congress wanted to encourage Indian tribes to further their economic interests, and thus they
were exempted t from the purview of Title VII); Mitchell Peterson, Student Article, The Applicability of
Federal Employment Law to Indian Tribes, 47 S.D. L. REV. 631, 631 (2002) (explaining that Title VII
"include[s] an express exemption for 'Indian tribes."').
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012) ("[T]he term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to
public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof."); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012) ("This title . . . shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational
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1. Well-Settled Case Law Supports the Contention that a Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification Does Not Exist For Race
The district court, in essence, created a BFOQ exception for race,
contrary to Title VII and well-settled case law, when it held that Plainfield
is not liable for the "Prefers No Black CNAs" assignment sheet. 51 "While
religion, sex or national origin can, in exceptional cases, be a BFOQ, race
cannot." 52 In Rucker v. Higher Educational Aids Board, the Seventh
Circuit held that "Title VII is a blanket prohibition of racial discrimination,
rational and irrational alike, even more so than of other forms of
discrimination attacked in Title VII."53
Among various circuit courts, it has been consistently held that it is
unlawful for an employer to discriminate based on race to accommodate
clientele.54 The Second Circuit in Knight v. Nassau County Civil Service
Commission, held the Commission's transfer of Knight, a black employee,
to the Recruitment Division where he was assigned to specifically deal with
minority recruitment, rather than being promoted within the Test
Development Division where he originally excelled beyond his white co-
workers, was solely based on Knight's race and was in violation of Title
VII.55 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit in Ferrill v. The Parker Group
Inc., found that a telephone marketing company that admittedly assigned
black employees to make phone calls to black households, and white
employees to make phone calls to white households, was liable for
intentional discrimination under Title VII for making race-based job
assignments. 56
As noted above, case law strongly supports the contention that no BFOQ
exists for race. Consequently, Plainfield's belief that the BFOQ for
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society
of its activities."); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(f) (2012) (stating that members of the Communist Party are not
entitled to Title VII's protection); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g) (2012) (excluding exployers engaged in
national security from Title VII's requirements); CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE, supra note 34
(noting the various exceptions to Title VII protection recognized by Congress and the various courts).
51 Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., No. 1:08-CV-00071, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97215, at *19
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2009).
52 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS TREATISE, supra note 34; Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305,
1308 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating the that BFOQ defense is not available when discrimination is based on an
individual's race, color, or ethnicity).
53 Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982).
54 See EEOC vs. St. Anne's Hospital of Chi., Inc., 664 F.2d 128, 133 n.7 (7th Cir. 1981); Miller v.
Tex. Bd. of Barber Exam'rs 615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1980); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633
F.2d 361, 370 n.13 (4th Cir. 1980).
55 Knight v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157, 159-60, 162 (2d Cir. 1981).
56 Ferrill v. The Parker Group Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472-73 (11 th Cir. 1999).
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discriminatory hiring practice based on gender translates into the same
exception with regards to race is tenuous. 57 Additionally, the contention
that if patients' discriminatory preferences are not adhered to, the right to
bodily integrity is violated due to the highly intrusive nature of health care
services, is mere conjecture. 58 The Seventh Circuit in Rucker reasoned that
Congress failed to include race as a BFOQ because race discrimination was
generally more common than other types of discrimination, such as gender
discrimination. 59 Gender discrimination is of a different sort than race
discrimination. Unlike sex, Congress considered and explicitly rejected a
race-based BFOQ.60 Furthermore, with the repeal of the Jim Crow Laws,
"there are no recognized privacy rights based on race." 61 Contrary to the
case law that Plainfield cited to support its assertion that race, like gender
discrimination, is tolerated in the medical field,62 the Seventh Circuit
properly noted that the "privacy interest that is offended when one
undresses in front of a doctor or nurse of the opposite sex does not apply to
race." 63
2. Legislative History of Title VII Establishes that Congress
Purposefully Excluded Race as a Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification
It is apparent when looking at the legislative history behind the
enactment of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that this Act was established to protect
individuals like Chaney from the exact treatment that Chaney endured
57 See Brief of Appellee at *25-26, Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir.
2010) (No. 09-3661), 2010 WL 2157107.
58 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 57, at *26.
59 Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982); Appellant's Reply Brief
at *2, Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3661), 2010 WL
2157108.
60 110 CONG. REc. 2550 (1964) (remarks of Congressman Emmanuel Celler) ("We did not include
the word 'race' because we felt that race or color would not be a bona fide qualification, as would be
'national origin.' That was left out. It should be left out.").
61 Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 59, at *2.
62 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 57, at *27 (citing AFSCME Local 567 v. State of Michigan,
635 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1986)); Philips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d
Cir. 2008) ("Individuals have a
constitutional liberty interest in personal bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth
Amendment.").
63 Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court also
explained that "U]ust as the law tolerates same-sex restrooms or same-sex dressing rooms, but not
white-only rooms, to accommodate privacy needs, Title VII allows an employer to respect a preference
for same-sex health providers, but not for same-race providers." Id.
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while employed at Plainfield Healthcare Center. "Congress' primary
concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in Title
VII ... was with 'the plight of the [African American] in our economy.'" 64
Congress worried that with the integration of blacks into society, the goal
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would not be achieved unless the trends
that were evident prior to the Civil Rights movement were reversed. 65
Consequently, during the Civil Rights movement, "it was clear to Congress
that 'the crux of the problem was to open employment opportunities for
[African Americans] in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
them,' and it was to this problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial
discrimination in employment was primarily addressed." 66
Additionally, Congressional hearings preceding the enactment of Title
VII support the assertion that Congress did not intend to include race as a
BFOQ. The majority of courts agree that Congress's failure to include race
as a BFOQ was intentional. 67 Senator Williams offered an amendment to
Title VII, requesting that race be included as a BFOQ. Senator Williams,
in his attempt to get support for his amendment to Title VII, brought to the
other Senators' attention the multimillion dollar businesses in the South
that are operated solely by "[African American] citizens" and businesses
that "cater exclusively to [African American] clientele." 68 Senator
Williams believed that without this amendment those businesses would be
destroyed. 69 Congressman Celler responded to the offered amendment,
stating, "[w]e did not include the word 'race' because we felt that race
would not be a bona fide qualification, as would 'national origin.' That
was left out. It should be left out." 70 The amendment was ultimately
rejected, "ayes 70, noes 108."71 Therefore, the legislative history of Title
VII demonstrates that Congress considered a race-based BFOQ, but
ultimately rejected its inclusion. 72 Consequently, "the district court's Order
6 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (citing 110 CONG. REc. 6548
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
65 See id. at 202 ("Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act -- the integration of
blacks into the mainstream of American society -- could not be achieved unless this trend were
reversed."); see also 110 CONG. REc. 7220 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
66 Weber, 443 U.S. at 203 (citations omitted).
67 See id. at 201-02; Rucker v. Higher Educational Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982);
Appellant's Brief at *17, Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-
3661), 2010 WL 2157106 ("[M]ost courts agree that the failure of Congress to include a race BFOQ
provision was an intentional act.").
68 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 110 CONG. REC. 2563 (1964).
72 See 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case); see generally 110
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[for summary judgment in favor of Plainfield] constitutes a judicial
amendment to Title VII, which explicitly prohibits BFOQ's based on
race." 73 The district court exceeded its bounds in creating an exception
when Congress' intent in enacting Title VII was explicit. 74
III. PLAINFIELD'S FAILURE To ESCAPE LIABILITY
The district court wrongfully absolved Plainfield from liability. The
court held that
Plainfield could not be held liable for creating a hostile work
environment by implementing discriminatory staff assignments because the
"policy clearly represented a good-faith effort to conform to the mandates
of Indiana law." 75 In granting summary judgment the district court failed to
realize that Plainfield's policy "is itself an unlawful employment practice
and a per se violation of Title VII."76
A. Discriminatory Liability: Plainfield's Blatant Disregard for The
Supremacy Clause, Long Standing Constitutional Principles & Section
708 of Title VII
Plainfield argued that the Supremacy Clause is inapplicable because
Indiana's residential
rights do not conflict with federally mandated Title VII.77 Furthermore,
the district court's holding that Plainfield's decision to leave the patient's
preference on the assignment sheet was reasonable, as a good faith effort to
conform to Indiana law,78 is a blatant disregard for constitutionally
CONG. REc. 2250-63 (1964) (House discussion on whether race and color should be a BFOQ
exception).
73 Appellant's Brief, supra note 67, at *17.
74 See id.
"Judicial amendment of a statute is justified only in limited circumstances, such as where Congress
provided no rule on the subject before the court, where it is necessary to save the statute from
being struck down as unconstitutional, where Congress essentially authorized the courts to
legislate on an issue, or where the statute would otherwise create an absurdity. .... 'Courts do not
create exceptions to statutes every time it seems that the legislature overlooked something. . . .The
judge will create a statutory exception only when ... it is necessary to save the statute from being
held unconstitutional, or when they have great confidence that the legislature could not have meant
what it seemed to [s]ay . . . .' Id. (quoting Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 484-85
(7th Cir. 1997).
75 Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., No. 1:08-CV-00071, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97215, at
*14-15 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2009).
76 Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission As Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at *20, Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir.
2010) (No. 09-3661), 2009 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 76 [hereinafter EEOC Amicus Curiae].
77 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 57, at *21; Chaney, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97215, at *18.
78 See Chaney, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97215, at *19. ("Plainfield cannot reasonably be held liable
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mandated principles. "The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
Supremacy Clause 79 to stand for the proposition that '[a] state statute is
void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute."' 80
Indiana law governing long-term care facilities provides that a resident has
a right to "choose a personal attending physician and other providers of
service." 81 Allowing a patient to choose his or her care provider on the
basis of race, in accordance with Indiana's patient's rights provisions,
would render Title VII meaningless. Reconciliation of the overly broad
rights granted to a patient to "choose its care provider" on the basis of race
under Indiana law, with the limiting factor set forth under Title VII, that
such choice cannot be manifested by a discriminatory preference, is not
possible. Therefore, the Supremacy Clause renders the portion of Indiana
statute allowing for discriminatory preferences in the care setting void.
Section 708 of Title VII specifically supersedes state laws that permit
unlawful employment practices, which the following cases illustrate. 82 For
example, Utility Workers Union of America v. Southern California Edison
Company dealt with this exact issue, holding that "Section 708 strongly
implies that any state law which requires or permits the doing of an act
which would be an unlawful employment practice under Title VII ...
whether or not it is 'protective,' is invalid." 83 The district court and
Plainfield interpreted Indiana law to mandate job assignments and
segregation on the basis of race. 84 Allowing Plainfield to act in a manner
for adopting a policy that permits a client to espouse racial bias, when that policy clearly represented a
good-faith effort to conform to the mandates of Indiana law.").
79 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United Sates which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treatise made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
80 Appellant's Brief, supra note 67, at *19 (quoting Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631
(1982)).
81 Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913-14 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting 410 IND.
ADMIN. CODE 16.2-3.1-3(n)(1) (2011)); see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 57, at *22 (discussing
how the Indiana Administrative Code resident rights provisions establish guidelines that long term care
facilities must adhere to when establishing policies that directly affect residents; these guidelines
include, but are not limited to: the right to receive services with reasonable accommodations to
individual needs and preferences, to make choices about aspects of care that are significant to the
resident, and the right to be cared for in a manner that maintains the resident's dignity in recognition of
the patient's individuality).
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2012) ("Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any
State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the
doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this title.").
83 Utility Workers Union of Ame. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
84 See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., No. 1:08-CV-00071, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97215, at
*18 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2009) (stating that if Plainfield had removed the racial notation preference on
patient forms that would have violated Indiana regulations).
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consistent with this interpretation, as the Seventh Circuit properly observes,
is a clear violation of Title VII.85 Consequently, consistent with Section
708, Plainfield remains liable, contrary to what it believed was required of
them under Indiana law.86
B. Neither Customer Preferences Nor The Business Necessity Doctrine
Provide Support For Unlawful Employment Practices Against a
Federally Mandated Law
Plainfield's assertion that the patients' privacy rights are paramount to
any rights that Chaney had as an employee of Plainfield is unwarranted.87
Plainfield defends its unlawful acts, attempting to distinguish this case from
cases in which customer preference was found to be unlawful under Title
V1188 by stating that a long-term care facility has obligations to its patients
that other employers do not have.89 The Seventh Circuit properly dismissed
Plainfield's claim, recognizing that it is well settled that "racial preferences
of... customers is not a defense under Title VII for treating employees
differently based on race." 90 Furthermore, EEOC's guidance manual and
case precedent have established that neither customer nor client preferences
can ever excuse or rationalize disparate treatment of employees based on
race.91
Plainfield's use of the business necessity doctrine as a defense to its
unlawful employment practices is misplaced. The "business necessity"
defense is available only in cases involving disparate impact, and not cases
85 Chaney, 612 F.3d at 914 ("If Plainfield's reading of the regulation (requiring it to instruct its
employees to honor a patient's racial preferences) were correct, it would conflict with Title VII.").
86 See id. ("Title VII does not, by contrast, contain a good-faith 'defense' that allows an employer
to ignore the statute in favor of conflicting state law."); see also 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964) ("Section
708 of this title vests in this Commission the authority to determine the effectiveness of State or local
action in the field of fair employment . . . Title VII leaves State and local [] laws untouched, except
where they are in conflict with it.").
87 See Chaney, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97215, at *19; Brief of Appellee, supra note 57, at *19.
88 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 57, at *19.
89 Chaney, 612 F.3d at 913.
90 Id The court cites various cases that support its conclusion including Johnson v. Zema Sys.
Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 744 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that evidence of a segregated sales force supported a
Title VII claim).; Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1530 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that if a
merchant refuses to hire a black worker because he believes that his customers do not like blacks, and
will not continue to do business at the merchant's shop if he continues to hire blacks, this refusal
constitutes discrimination because it is treating individuals different on account of their race).
91 Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is clearly forbidden
by Title VII, to refuse on racial grounds to hire someone because your customers or clientele do not
like his race."); EEOC Amicus Curiae, supra note 76, at *10 ("Longstanding Circuit precedent and
EEOC guidance establish that client or customer preference cannot excuse or justify race-based
disparate treatment of employees.").
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that involve intentional discrimination. 92 An case where the business
necessity doctrine was a proper defense to unlawful discrimination in the
employment sector came from the Fifth Circuit in Baker v. City of St.
Petersburg.93 In Baker, the St. Petersburg Police Department restricted the
work assignments of black officers to the policing of black citizens, which
was found to violate equal protection and Title VII.94 However, the court
noted two situations where the assignments of blacks to specific tasks
based on their race would be acceptable: "For example, the undercover
infiltration of an all-[African American] criminal organization or
plainclothes work in an area where a white man could not pass without
notice. Special assignments might also be justified during brief periods of
unusually high racial tension." 95 The discrimination that Chaney faced as
an employee of Plainfield cannot be justified under the business necessity
doctrine. Chaney was a CNA with the same qualifications as her white co-
workers, but she was restricted from performing her duties in the same
respect because of her race. Consequently, by no means is Plainfield's use
of racial preferences a "facially neutral policy."96
IV. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF NURSING HOMES AND THE "BABY BOOMER"
GENERATION
It is no revelation that the two largest groups of people found in long-
term care facilities are nurse's aides and residents, who are often "racially
and ethnically disparate." 97 One of the major factors that influence racial
disparity between residents and their care providers is the
overrepresentation of minorities working as nurse's aides,98 and the over-
92 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2); Appellant's Brief, supra note 67, at *22 (quoting Miller v. Tex. State
Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1980)) ("The [BFOQ] exception applies to
intentional and unintentional discrimination but the business necessity doctrine is apparently limited to
practices which are facially neutral but discriminatory in operation.").
93 See Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1968).
94 See id. at 295.
95 Id. at 301 n.10.
96 Appellant's Brief, supra note 67, at *22.
97 Celia Berdes & John M. Eckert, Race Relations and Caregiving Relationships: A Qualitative
Examination of Perspectives From Residents and Nurse's Aides in Three Nursing Homes, 23
RESEARCH ON AGING 109, 109 (2001) ("It is hardly a revelation to people who have worked in nursing
homes that the two largest groups found there, residents and nurse's aides, are often racially and
ethnically disparate."); Northwestern University, Majority of Nursing Home Aides Experience Racism
From Residents and Staff, SCIENCE BLOG (Nov. 2002),
http://scienceblog.com/community/older/2002/D/20024416.html [hereinafter SCIENCE BLOG].
98 See Berdes & Eckert, supra note 97, at 109-10 (explaining that there are three major factors that
"are at work in the racial disparity of residents and aides in nursing homes," one being the
overrepresentation of minority nurses aides); see also SCIENCE BLOG, supra note 97.
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predominance of white nursing home residents. 99 The underrepresentation
of African Americans in nursing homes can be explained by two factors.
First, among African Americans there is a cultural preference for home
care. As a result of this preference, African American's generally use
nursing homes at "a rate between one-half and three-quarters of that of
Whites."oo Second, the "baby boomer" generation, consisting of those
people who were born between 1945 and 1964, is marching towards
retirement.101 In 2009, 76% of the "baby boomer" generation was white,
while only 10% was African American. 102 The preference of African
Americans to seek home care, the underrepresentation of African
Americans in the "baby boomer" generation seeking long-term care, and
the overrepresentation of minority care providers are factors that greatly
influence the racial disparity of residents and care providers.
The majority of these individuals who seek refuge in long-term care
were born during a time of racial isolation, and what was once legally and
socially acceptable has drastically changed with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act. 103 Today, "baby boomers" are experiencing many changes,
including those involving health care. 104 The effects of aging are
"increasingly defined and experienced as the gradual loss of autonomy
99 See Berdes & Eckert, supra note 97, at 110 (discussing a statistical breakdown of racial
distribution of nursing home residents in Cook County, Illinois, and noting that out of 231 nursing
homes, "the 189 facilities in which whites constituted more than 50% of the population had on average
10% African American residents; 66 (35%) of these had no African Americans at all, and an additional
15 (8%) had only one African American resident."); see also SCIENCE BLOG, supra note 97.
100 Berdes & Eckert, supra note 97, at 110.
101 See Patrick M. Gavin & Joanne R. Lax, When Residents and Family Harass Staff The
Tightrope Between Regulatory Compliance, Risk Management and Employment Liability, LONG TERM
CARE & THE LAW 1 (Feb. 27, 2008) (American Health Lawyers Association Seminar Materials); see
also Shelly Klaessy, Research and Trends: Baby Boomer Values Give Insight Into Buying Decisions,
MANAGEMENT-MARKETING-LEASING TODAY, Oct. 2005 [hereinafter Research and Trends] ("These
first wave Boomers (numbering nearly 37 million), were born between 1946 and 1955, and are between
50 and 59 years of age today.").
102 See Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Demographic Profile of America's Older
Babyboomers (2010), available at http://www.metlife.com/.../Profiles/mmi-older-boomer-demographic-
profile.pdf; see also United States Census Bureau, The Older Population in the United States: 2009,
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/age/older_2009.html.
103 Research and Trends, supra note 101 (stating that baby boomers have a view of the world
vastly different from other generations); Gavin & Lax, supra note 101, at I (noting that baby boomers
were raised with values of what was legally and socially acceptable that differ from those values of
younger generations, not born in the "baby boomer" era).
104 See Research and Trends, supra note 101 (stating that baby boomers are "currently
experiencing changes in family priorities, changes in health, and changes in how they experience the
world around them."); see also John Carvel & Jeevan Vasagar, Plan to Withdraw Treatment from
Racist Patients: Zero Tolerance of Abuse Under New Guidelines, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 25, 2002,
http://www/guardian.co.uk/soiety/2002/jan/25/raceequalityNHS (explaining how "[riacist hospital
patients who persistently refuse care from doctors and nurses of a different ethnic origin will lose their
right to treatment under the NHS").
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culminating in admission to a nursing home." 05 The feeling of
vulnerability caused by a loss of autonomy, which at times is coupled with
the onset of illness, can lead to a more overt expression of racist views. 106
However, the feeling of autonomy and onset of illness will not completely
define or explain why some elderly patients overtly express their racist
views because the "motivational foundations of human behavior have
enormous complexity."l 07 One researcher has described categorization of
"irrational prejudice to be ambiguous" where those individuals who grew
up during times of racial isolation have beliefs that members of a particular
group have characteristics that they do not in fact have, or a belief that most
members of a group have certain characteristics when only a few do. 08
V. FACING THE DILEMMA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECISION
Chaney has set precedent in the Seventh Circuit and established a bright
line rule for the medical field: the right to choose a care provider does not
lend itself to a right to choose based on the race of a care provider. The
issue presented in Chaney is not novel; cases analogous to Chaney's have
settled before a judicial opinion on the merits was rendered.109 Since this is
the first time a judicial opinion has been rendered on this particular issue, it
is imperative that the implications be discussed. It is also important that
members of the medical field begin a dialogue on how to remedy the
conflicting obligations set forth by OBRA 87 and Title VII.
A. Void for Vagueness?
The Seventh Circuit has established a bright line rule in Chaney that
patients' rights are
105 Maureen Armour, A Nursing Home's Good Faith Duty "To" Care: Redefining a Fragile
Relationship Using the Law of Contract, 39 ST. LOUIs L.J 217, 229 (1994).
106 See Carvel & Vasagar, supra note 104 (explaining that the expression of racist views "can often
become more overt among the elderly people when they are confused or when suffering from diseases
that affect their inhibitions, so they can become uninhibited."); see also Berdes & Eckert, supra note 97,
at 118 (noting that many nurse's aides have in the study forgiven racist comments by patients because
they understand that the patients were born during a different generation and were often senile).
107 Sunstein, supra note 3, at 385.
108 Sunstein, supra note 3, at 388-89.
109 See, e.g., Gary S. Starr & Peter J. Murphy, Elder Law: Patient Choice Versus Employee Rights:
Conflicting Obligations?, CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE, Jan. 24, 2011 available at
http://www.ctlawtribune.com/getarticle.aspx?ID=39404 (discussing the settlement decision in EEOC v.
HiCare Inc.); Charles Wilson, Ind. Ruling Halts Caregiver Choices Based on Race, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 23, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9232635 (mentioning a
case involving an Indianapolis nursing home similar to Chaney the resulted in an $85,000 settlement).
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not paramount to the rights of employees under Title VII, and that
promoting a hostile work environment can lead to legal ramifications.
However, the question still remains, what exactly would it take to be held
legally responsible for the promotion of a hostile work environment?
Justice Ginsberg, in her dissent in AMTRAK v. Morgan,1 0 makes clear that
hostile work environment claims are "fundamentally different from claims
based on 'discrete facts' because the discrimination accumulates over an
extended period of time." 11l However, despite the fact that such claims are
not always easily identifiable at the outset, "[i]t is a basic principle of due
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined. . . . [because] [v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning."ll 2 The test set out by the court - that a minority
employee must show that the work environment was both objectively and
subjectively hostile, and that the conduct was severe - is vague, and allows
for arbitrary opinions of whether a certain set of facts lends themselves to
the creation of a hostile work environment. Consequently, "if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them."ll 3
In Chaney's case, the bigotry was obvious, but it is not always going to
be so clear. It is not the law that is vague in this instance, but the standard.
The Seventh Circuit follows an overly flexible standard of how to identify
a "hostile work environment," and gives barely thought out suggestions on
how to deal with hostile patients. If Plainfield had not written "Prefers No
Black CNAs" on the assignment sheet, and instead pulled Chaney aside
and voiced the patient's concerns with having Chaney as her care provider,
and Chaney by her own free will chose to respect the patients request,
would this have constituted the creation of a hostile work environment?
Or, what happens if a patient is extremely ill but acting in a discriminatory
manner towards the facility's health care staff. Would staffers have a claim
against the care facility if they chose to let the patient remain because of his
or her health condition? There is no quick bright line answer to any of
these scenarios, but it is these scenarios that may lead to future claims,
which is why the court's vague opinion needs to be fleshed out beyond the
legalities of Title VII and hostile work claims.
110 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
Ill Pete Lareau, Lareau on Aftermath ofLily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3783
(2009).
112 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)
113 Id
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B. The "Dilemma" Between Respecting Patient's Autonomy While
Protecting The Rights ofHealth Care Employees
There are many psychological issues that patients and their families face
when a loved one is admitted into a long-term care facility, but
psychological issues do not give patients a free pass to act in a
discriminatory manner towards their care providers.114 Chaney sheds light
on the obvious "tensions within anti-discriminatory discourses in hospice
care that are concerned both with fairness in policies and practices and with
the need to combat discrimination."'l 5 The different "philosophies of
hospice care and anti-discriminatory discourses play a significant role in
constructing the nature of staff dilemma in their responses to incidents of
racial harassment."116 The recurring theme seems to be that of "dilemma."
There is Plainfield's dilemma, between adhering to patient preferences in
accordance with Indiana law, while protecting the rights of its employees
under Title VII. Additionally, there is Chaney's dilemma, choosing to
abide by the patient's discriminatory request and Plainfield's instructions
not to care for the patient, and her right to non-discriminatory treatment
under Title VII. The term dilemma, as one researcher phrased it, refers "to
potentially problematic and unresolvable tensions within representations of
perceptions, emotions and actions." 17
Condoning racial harassment or discriminatory preferences at the
expense of care providers, as Plainfield did, cannot be justified. "Racist
behavior needs to be addressed as an institutional issue, not a personal
one." 18 Chaney has shed light on the fact that the management of hostile
patients should be a "team decision." Chaney was faced with repeated
bigotry without the support of her colleagues or Plainfield. There was
nowhere for Chaney to turn; her attempt to seek advice and remedy the
situation was dismissed by the facility when it determined that the patient's
preferences were paramount to her rights as an employee. The Seventh
Circuit correctly dismissed Plainfield's theory of the superiority of patients'
114 See Lidi Schapira et al., Racism in the Chemotherapy Infusion Unit: A Nurse's Story, 13 THE
ONCOLOGIST 1177, 1179 (2008), available at
http://theoncologist.alphamedpress.org/cgi/reprint/13/l1/1177 ("Illness is not an excuse for racism. If
[care facilities] allow this language to go unchallenged [the facilities] become accomplices."); see also
Julia Neuberger, Commentary: A Role for Personal Values .. . and Management, 318 BRITISH MED. J.
1130, 1130 (1999).
115 Yasmin Gunaratnam, 'We Mustn't Judge People.. . But': Staff Dilemmas in Dealing With
Racial Harassment Amongst Hospice Service Users, 23 Soc. OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 65,66-67 (2001).
116 Id. at 70.
117 Id. at7l.
118 Schapira et al., supra note 114, at 1180.
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rights. A nurse's professional practice is founded on his or her code of
professional conduct, respecting the autonomy and privacy of individual
patients regardless of race, religion, values, or practices. However, the
code of professional conduct is insufficient when racist abuse and bigotry is
present, and where such action encroaches on the wellbeing of medical
staffers and other patients. 119
The court's holding implicates the need to engage long-term care
providers in a new way of thinking. It is important now that long-term care
facilities promote a method of "[d]iagnostic thinking [to] help[] sort
through the possible reasons or motivations of [a] patient [who asserts a
discriminatory preference]. Was he feeling helpless, scared, or out of
control?"1 20 Engaging in this type of diagnostic thinking will allow the
facilities to take part in more appropriate responses oriented toward putting
the patient at ease. 121 If the patient's behavior cannot be managed, then
further action need be taken, as discussed infra in Section VI.
A facility need not take the easy route and dismiss the discriminatory
preferences by isolating the patient, "[t]o do so would be to miss the real
tragedy and ignore the toxic legacy of racism."1 22 In adhering to the
patient's preferences, Plainfield ignored the "tragedy" at hand. The
Seventh Circuit, by rendering its decision against Plainfield, has forced
Plainfield and other similarly situated care facilities to confront the issue of
discrimination in their facilities. Plainfield's solution, to isolate the hostile
patient from Chaney, and shift the patient's care to a non-minority
caregiver "has significant logistic disadvantages and sets a dangerous
precedent," because the accommodation of racist behavior breaches
accepted standards of health care that have been acknowledged by
society. 123 If a patient fails to reform his or her behavior, it may be
appropriate for a care facility to release the patient from its care. Since all
119 See Pippa Gough, Commentary: Courteous Containment is Not Enough, 318 BRITISH MED. J.
1131, 1131 (1999), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1 115523/ (explaining
that the starting point for nurses is to care for and treat all patients with respect and autonomy despite
their patients' attitudes, values, or beliefs. But this type of treatment does not suffice when there is a
case of racist abuse and bigotry); see also Charles Easmon, Commentary: Isolate the Problem. 318
BRITISH MED. J. 1130, 1130 (1999).
120 Schapira et al., supra note 114, at 1180.
121 See id.; see also Helen Tinsley-Jones, Racism: Calling a Spade a Spade, 40 PSYCHOTHERAPY:
THEORY, RES., PRAC., TRAINING 179, 183 (2003).
122 See Schapira et al., supra note 114, at 1180; see also Gough, supra note 119, at 1131
(discussing the case of a racist patient, and explaining that "[tlreatment [of the patient] continued once
the environment had been modified to suit the racist view [of the patient]. A mini apartheid was created.
[However,] [m]ere containment, with no expression of repugnance for the views being aired or more
positive action, seems to be professionally and morally questionable.").
123 Schapira et al., supra note 114, at 1180 ("[A]ccommodating racist behavior can be thought of
as a breach of commonly accepted standards for society as a whole.").
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patients are entitled by law to provide care in a reasonable manner, a
physician that does not believe he or she can meet this standard of care for
a particular patient is "entitled to terminate [the] healthcare relationship
provided that [the physician and facility] act reasonably to ensure
continuity of care for the patient."' 24 Furthermore, "differences in the
accounts of the same incident can be located in differences in professional
caring roles, responsibilities and status, where doctors ... can have
significantly less day-to-day contact and emotional involvement with
service users."1 25 Because one health care professional is not entirely
offended by the behavior of a patient does not discount the feelings of
another health care professional, and facilities should be respectful of each
individual employee's feelings.
The implications and the solutions discussed above, and infra in Part
VI, are not necessarily applicable to situations involving emergency care or
the presence of life-threatening illness. It is understood in the medical field
that these types of situations influence the manner in which discriminatory
confrontations are managed due to the level of care needed at that
particular time. 126 For example, if a cardiac arrest patient is about to go
under for life saving heart surgery and is acting hostile towards the staff of
an emergency facility, making requests for doctors based on race, the
facility cannot refuse to treat the patient, but will also not be liable if they
do not abide by the patient's request. However, in the long-term care
setting, Chaney establishes the need for policy reform, as taking any action
that promotes or allows discriminatory behavior to fall by the wayside will
be a step backwards in terms of combating racial discrimination. Even
though care facilities "have no jurisdiction over beliefs, prejudices, or
comments made outside [of] treatment facilities, [they] can enforce a
culture of tolerance and civility [from] within." 27
124 University of Illinois at Chicago College of Medicine, Ethics in Clerkships,
http://www.uic.edu/depts/mcam/ethics/difficult.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2011); see also Harris County
Medical Association, Physician Patient Relationship, http://www.hcms.org/Template.aspx?id=247 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2011) ("Physicians have a duty to support continuity of care for their patients; therefore,
they may not discharge a patient as long as further treatment is medically indicated.").
125 Gunaratnam, supra note 115, at 78.
126 Schapira et al., supra note 114, at 1180 ("We recognize that there is a spectrum of personal
values and ethical mandates that influence the behavior and responses of individual nurses and doctors,
and the presence of life-threatening illness will likely influence how such confrontations are
managed."); Dov Steinmetz & Hava Tabenkin, The 'Difficult Patient' As Perceived By Family
Physicians, 18 FAM. PRAC. 495, 495 (2001) ("Various social and medical conditions were found to be
difficult for physicians.").
127 Schapira et al., supra note 114, at 1180.
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VI. CHANEY FALLS SHORT: How To AVOID THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL
BIND BETWEEN ADHERING To PATIENT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE NURSING
HOME REFORM ACT AND EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS UNDER TITLE VII
The court was correct when it drew a line between patient's rights and
the rights of employers, essentially finding that "[w]hen consumer direction
comes up against choices based on race and ethnicity, workers' civil rights
are implicated and they trump the right to choose health care providers."128
However, the court fell short in its suggestion to long-term care facilities on
how to avoid the dichotomy between unlawful employment practices and
hostile residents.129 Health care providers have long been under the
impression that patients are free to choose their care providers based on
discriminatory characteristics until the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Chaney.130 It is no secret that "[e]lderly residents who grew up in an era of
racial intolerance ... may revert to behavior learned in youth and young
adulthood. The behavior may include racial slurs or demeaning behavior
towards racial minorities,"1 31 which will consequently lead to a hostile
work environment. Some solutions that the court suggested, including
cultural competency and behavior contracting, are well-thought solutions;
but their implementation needs to be developed. Cultural competency
training generally focuses on the health care providers, while behavior
contracting focuses on a shared initiative between the patient and care
providers.
A. Cultural Competency Training
Cultural competency is a strategy that has recently gained attention as a
method to
128 Vega, supra note 8.
129 See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[A] long-term
care facility confronted with a hostile resident has a range of options. It can warn residents before
admitting them of the facility's nondiscriminatory policy, securing the resident's consent in writing; it
can attempt to reform the resident's behavior after admission; and it can assign staff based on race-
neutral criteria that minimize the risk of conflict.").
130 See Foubister, supra note 1 (noting that the American Medical Association's guidelines only
emphasize that caregivers cannot choose to accept or decline patients on discriminatory characteristics,
but says that patients are not bound by the same obligations as the care facilities); see also National
School Boards Association, Employment Discrimination Against Caregivers,
http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Federal-
Regulations/Archive/Employmentdiscriminationagainstcaregivers.txt (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (stating
that even federal equal oppurtunity laws "do not prohibit discrimination against caregivers per se").
131 Gavin & Lax, supra note 101, at 12.
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improve the quality of health care, as well as to eliminate both racial and
ethnic disparities in health care. 132 The broad range of patient perspectives
in health care, influenced by patient's social or cultural backgrounds, is
inevitable due to the increasing diversity of the United States. 133 Patient
preferences are driven by, but not limited to, shared languages, cultural
preferences, and social experiences.134 Consequently, because of the vast
spectrum of cultural attitudes and experiences, cultural competence on the
part of the physician is necessary for they have taken on the responsibility
of caring for these patients. "[C]ross-cultural competence - defined as 'the
knowledge, skills, attitudes, and behavior required of a practitioner to
provide optimal health care services to persons from a wide range of
cultural backgrounds' - is key to providing quality health care, [and]
exposure to a racially diverse environment helps providers acquire such
competence."l 35 It would be much more difficult to implement a similar
type of training with patients. If a patient has racist feelings due to a
visceral aversion to African Americans, any opportunity for exchanges on
controversial issues involving race would likely not advance a mutual
understanding between the white patient and the African American care
provider on issues of racial stereotyping and discrimination.136
Many health care providers tend to justify discriminatory employment
practices as a means to accommodate the preferences of patients, who tend
to be more comfortable with same-race care providers.1 37 Even though
132 Joseph R. Betancourt et al., Cultural Competence and Health Care Disparities: Key
Perspectives and Trends, 24 HEALTH AFF. 499, 499 (2005) ("Cultural competence has gained attention
as a potential strategy to improve quality and eliminate racial/ethnic disparities in health care."); see
also Sponsors, Researchers and Government Examine How to Increase Minority Clinical Trial
Participation, GUIDE TO GOOD CLINICAL PRAC. NEWSL. , June 2007 ("[C]ultural competency ...
refers to the ability to honor and respect the beliefs, language, interpersonal styles, and behaviors of
individuals and families receiving services.").
133 See Betancourt et al., supra note 132, at 499; Developing Cultural Competence at Long-Term
Care Facilities: Policies, Staff Training Recommended, NURSING HOME REG. MANUAL NEWSL., Feb.
2009.
134 Frederick M. Chen et al., Patients' Beliefs About Racism, Preferences for Physician Race, and
Satisfaction With Care, 3 ANNALS OF FAMILY MED. 138, 138 (2005); see also Janice Hopkins Tanne,
Patients Are More Satisfied With Care From Doctors ofSame Race, BMJ, Nov. 9, 2002, at 1057.
135 Helen Norton, Stepping Through Grutter's Open Doors: What the University of Michigan
Affirmative Action Cases Mean For Race-Conscious Government Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV.
543, 571-72 (2005).
136 See Robert M. Entman, Young Men of Color in the Media: Images and Impacts, JOINT CENTER
FOR POL. & ECON. STUD. 1, 31 (2006) (noting that research has demonstrated that unless white
participants taking part in exchanges on controversial issues with African Americans have been
educated in advance on the subtleties of racial discrimination and stereotyping, these exchanges will not
lead to a mutual understanding).
137 See Norton, supra note 135, at 572. ("Thornier, in my view, is the contention that race-
conscious hiring of health care professionals is justified to accommodate the preferences of patients of
color who feel more comfortable with same-race doctors."); see also Somnath Saha et al., Do Patients
Choose Physicians of Their Own Race?, 19 HEALTH AFF. 76, 82 (2000).
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many of the studies focusing on patient preferences have focused on the
preferences of minorities, attitudes that shape these preferences are present
in all patients, no matter their race, religion, or national origin. The studies
that have demonstrated that patients of color prefer health care providers of
the same race "also found that significant numbers of minorities prefer not
to have doctors of their own race, perhaps reflecting ingrained racial
stereotypes that would only be reinforced by accommodating such
preferences."1 38 Health care providers that emphasize to their patients that
cross-cultural competence is a primary measure in their hiring and
promotion decisions will ease patients' concerns that their health care
provider will not understand their personal issues due to cultural
barriers.139 A racially diverse workforce that is culturally competent will
not only increase the trust that a patient has for his or her care provider, but
will enhance the health institution's legitimacy by facilitating interactions
among racially diverse colleagues, lending to the exchange of varying
perspectives and approaches to improve patient health care.140 Race
matching can facilitate deliberate discriminatory decisions that "reinforce[]
unconscious bias,"l41 and can hurt medical professionals' relationships
with their patients.
The importance of cultural competency is not a novel concept, but the
discussion of mandating cultural competency training in the medical field
is a recent phenomenon.142 "The goal of cultural competence is to create a
health care system and workforce that is capable of delivering the highest-
quality care to every patient regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, or
language proficiency." 43 Cultural competency teachings are not meant to
make care providers feel as if they are incompetent or racist, they are meant
to enhance professional development and facilitate the education of care
providers on the latest science in communications and communicating
138 Norton, supra note 135, at 573.
139 Norton, supra note 135, at 573; Saha et al., supra note 137, at 81.
140 See Norton, supra note 135, at 574; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) ("In
order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy ... it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions
that provide this training.").
141 Norton, supra note 135, at 564 ("[I]individuals of all races often unconsciously use stereotypes
as cognitive short-cuts to make sense of an information-laden world by placing newly-encountered
items into previously created categories with ascribed meanings.").
142 See Susan J. Landers, Mandating Cultural Competency: Should Physicians Be Required To
Take Courses?, Am. MED. NEWS, Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2009/10/19/prsal0l 9.htm.
143 Betancourt et al., supra note 132, at 499.
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effectively across cultures.144 Cultural competency has been proven to
make a difference in health care providers' knowledge, attitudes and skills,
and leads to increased satisfaction in patient care. 145 The vast amount of
studies that have been done in the medical field "provide overwhelming
evidence .. . [that] [m]inority patients appear to be getting worse care and
having worse outcomes than white patients with the same health
problems." 46 Even though Chaney dealt more specifically with patient
preferences and not the resulting care of the patient, the court could have
used the precedent set forth by its holding to send a message to the medical
field that training such as cultural competency will relieve a lot of the
problems that the medical field faces with regards to hostile patients and
patient preferences.
Trust is a fundamental part of the patient-care provider relationship. 147
To even begin to build trust between patients and their care providers,
institutions such as Plainfield must facilitate interaction between the patient
and the care provider, rather than hinder it by adhering to the racial
preferences of their patients. A greater number of interactions between the
patient and their care provider will generally lead to an increase in the
patient's trust of that care provider.148 There is no telling whether this
would have been the outcome in Chaney's case, but it would likely have
alleviated any hostility that Latshaw had towards Chaney, potentially
increasing her trust in Chaney as her care provider. It has been noted that
"[w]hen patients are satisfied with their physicians' style, effective
communication, leading to improved adherence and health outcomes,
becomes more likely." 49
In 1994, a survey found that only 13 out of 78 responding medical
144 Landers, supra note 142 ("The goal of this set of teachings is not about making anybody feel
they are incompetent or racist in any way. It is about professional development. It is about learning the
latest science in communications and communicating across cultures.").
145 Myrle Croasdale, Cultural Competency Training Has An Impact, AM. MED. NEWS, June 20,
2005, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/06/20/prsd620.htm; Mary Catherine Beach et al.,
Cultural Competence: A Systematic Review of Health Care Provider Educational Interventions, 43
MED. CARE 356, 362-63 (2005).
146 Myrtle Croasdale, Research Documents Disparities, But Solutions Remain Elusive, AM. MED.
NEWS, Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/04/04/prl20404.htm.
147 Doescher et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Perceptions of Physician Style and Trust, 9
ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 1156, 1157 (2000) ("Trust is a fundamental component of the patient-physician
relationship."); see also Carolyn Clancy et al., 42.2 J. FAM. PRAC. 129, 129 (1996) ("A bond to
someone you trust may be healing in and of itself. This relationship is essential when guiding patients
through the health system.").
148 See Doescher et al., supra note 147, at 1162; see also David Mechanic, Changing Medical
Organization and the Erosion of Trust, 74 MILBANK Q. 171, 175 (1996) ("[Ilnterpersonal trust is based
primarily on social interactions over time. Interpersonal trust builds on the patient's experience of the
doctor's competent, responsible, and caring responses.").
149 Doescher et al., supra note 147, at 1156.
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institutions offered cultural sensitivity courses. 150 However, recent trends
in health care are evidence that cultural competency training is a positive
initiative for the medical field, 51 and that it is important to teaching
physicians to become more patient-centered by teaching them the relevant
skills.152 In 2004 it was found that out of "8,000 graduate medical
educational programs surveyed in the United States, 50.7 percent offered
cultural competence training in 2003-2004, up from 35.7 percent in 2000-
2001."l53
To facilitate a growth in trust and understanding between patients and
their care providers, a medical facility must understand what a cultural
competency training program would include. The program training should
not only discuss overall cultural competence, but should also focus on the
specific population groups and health issues that are relevant to the
particular community that their facility serves. 154 An institution should also
address the linguistic needs of its patients, including "organizational,
clinical, and linguistic competence."155 Additionally, there are a number of
effective cultural competency training programs already in existence,
including Cross- Cultural Health Care Program, Management Sciences for
Health, and Center for Cross-Cultural Health.156 Established programs have
proven to be very effective and generally provide a consultant as part of the
package to explain the program and the best method of implementation.57
Lastly, an institution can choose to institute a cultural competency training
program developed by them. The benefit of this method is that a specific
institution's training department knows its organization's culture best, and
150 Doescher et al., supra note 147, at 1162.
151 See Betancourt et al., supra note 132, at 501 (noting that many health care insurers have
mandated cultural competency training for their internal medical doctors, nurses and case managers);
see also Jason A. Wolf, The Role of Cultural Competence in Delivering Positive Patient Experiences: 4
Focal Points, BECKER'S HosP. REV., Aug. 11, 2011, http://www.beckershospitaireview.com/hospitaL-
management-administration/the-role-of-cultural-competence-in-delivering-positive-patient-experiences-
4-focal-points.html.
152 See Doescher et al., supra note 147, at 1162; see also, Fredric M. Wolf et al., A Controlled
Experiment in Teaching Students To Respond To Patients' Emotional Concerns, 62 J. MED. EDUC. 25,
25 (1987).
153 Betancourt et al., supra note 132, at 502.
154 Alloy Educ., Providing Cultural Competency Training For Your Nursing Staff,
MINORITYNURSE.COM, http://www.minoritynurse.com/print/220 [hereinafter Minority Nurse]; see also
BETANCOURT ET AL., FIELD REPORT, CULTURAL COMPETENCE IN HEALTH CARE: EMERGING
FRAMEWORKS AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES 7 (2002).
155 Minority Nurse, supra note 154.
156 Minority Nurse, supra note 154.
157 Minority Nurse, supra note 154; see also Anthony Cirillo, Cultural Sensitivity Training: One
Step in Achieving Person-Centered Care, ABOUT.COM,
http://assistedliving.about.com/od/caringforclients/a/cultural-sensitivity-training.htm [hereinafter
Cultural Sensitivity Training].
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would generally have a good grasp of what approaches are most
effective.158 If this is the chosen method, it is important for the institution
to seek the advice of a consultant who has the experience and expertise in
cross-cultural health issues. 159 No matter what, cultural competency
training programs are an essential step in breaking the barriers of
discrimination in the health field because "cultural issues are alive and well
and constantly changing."60
While cultural competency is useful to the staff of long-term care
facilities, giving them a better understanding of how patients' racial
preferences can undermine staff morale while also educating them on
religious and cultural practices of America's diverse population, it is
unlikely that this type of training can completely change the racial attitudes
ingrained in some patients. While cultural competency training may have
advanced Chaney's understanding of her patients' culture and religion and
increased the trust that her patients had in her ability to care for them, it
may not have had any affect on the way Latshaw viewed Chaney.
Both racial isolation and the ideal that African Americans are
undereducated and less intelligent than whitesl6' can have a potentially
grave effect on patients, such as Latshaw's views on minority care
providers. Individuals often have tendencies toward "remembering
unfavorable behaviors associated with the outgroup."162 Moreover, when
weight is given to individuals who tend to confirm a given stereotype rather
than those who disconfirm it, the result is the continued existence of a
given stereotype, specifically that African Americans are inferior and less
educated than whites.163 When a white patient has a superiority complex,
the thought of having a care provider that a patient views as inferior to
himself or herself is difficult for the patient to grasp, even if their care
provider is "culturally competent." Furthermore, if a patient generally
adheres to egalitarian ideals, holding themselves out as non-racists,
theorists believe that "unrecognized negative feelings and cognitive
158 Minority Nurse, supra note 154; Cultural Sensitivity Training, supra note 157.
159 See Minority Nurse, supra note 154; see also Cultural Sensitivity Training, supra note 157.
160 Minority Nurse, supra note 154.
161 See generally Charles H.F. Davis Ill, Black People Genetically Predisposed To Be Less
Intelligent?, FRESHXPRESS, April 30, 2010, http://thefreshxpress.com/2010/04/harvard-student-says-
black-people-genetically-predisposed-to-be-less-intelligent; see also Herbert L. Foster, Educators' and
Non-Educators'Perceptions ofBlack Males: A Survey, 1 J. AFR. AM. MEN 37 (1995).
162 Entman, supra note 136, at 6.
163 Entman, supra note 136, at 6 (discussing the fact that individuals let their ideals about
individuals be shaped by those who confirm stereotypes rather than those who disconfirm stereotypes);
see also Sarah Murray, Humanizing The Accused Gang Defendant, TRIAL BEHAVIOR CONSULTING,
http://www.trialbehavior.corn/publications/articles/HumanizingGang.
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associations concerning persons of color [still exist], which can lead to
prejudicial behavior." 64
In situations where there is a visceral reaction towards a particular racial
group, it is unlikely that cultural competency training alone will remedy a
circumstance involving a hostile patient with discriminatory preferences.
Issues involving race are sensitive matters, and it is difficult to get even
young individuals "who are both old enough to understand concepts like
stereotyping and fairness, and young enough, one would hope, to change
their views-to communicate honestly and remain open to other groups'
views." 165 In order to make any progress, in conjunction with cultural
competency training, there must be inter-group dialogues and educational
interventions. More frequent interactions between hostile patients and their
minority care providers may allow for the diminishment of any distrust a
patient may have in their care provider, while also promoting education in
racial discourse.166 Dialogues and interventions of this nature are not going
to have an immediate effect on race relations in long-term care facilities but
can move race relations in long-term care facilities in a positive direction,
towards defeating discriminatory stereotypes.
B. Behavior Contracting
The court, in discussing alternatives for Plainfield, suggested that not
only should facilities notify patients of their nondiscrimination policy,
"securing the resident's consent in writing," but that health care facilities
should "attempt to reform the resident's behavior after admission" 67 if
such behavior is leading to a hostile work environment. It is imperative
that long-term care providers set forth their zero-tolerance discrimination
policies at the outset of every patient's care. This will act as a notification
to all patients that racist behavior will not be tolerated under any
circumstances. Further, if a patient is hostile during his or her time at a
facility, it is important for the facility to set forth some type of behavior
contact with the patient to remedy his or her behavior. While the Chaney
court found that behavior contracts might be appropriate under certain
circumstances, the court failed to realize that it is difficult to implement
behavior contracts when you have a "resident scream[ing] racial epithets at
164 Entman, supra note 136, at 11.
165 Entman, supra note 136, at 31.
166 Entman, supra note 136, at 31 (discussing how to reduce the negative image of black males
portrayed by the media); see also Roy J. Lewicki & Edward C. Tomlinson, Trust and Trust Building,
BEYOND INTRACTABILITY, Dec. 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/node /2608.
167 Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2010).
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the minority employee while he or she is merely trying to do their job."168
Due to the reality of these situations, the court should have had more
developed suggestions for healthcare institutions, guiding them to
appropriately contract with hostile patients. It may not be the court's
responsibility to discuss the implementation of behavior contracts, but
because the Seventh Circuit's decision will have far reaching implications,
a more elaborate explanation is necessary to prevent an influx of similar
litigation.
Behavior contracts can be an extremely effective tool for altering
aggressive behavior, and can "be a positive learning experience leading to
mutual understanding and improved relations between patients and
staff."169 Effective behavior contracts attempt to change a patient's
problematic behavior.170 Problematic behavior is defined as any behavior
that may lead to self-injury or that creates a hostile work environment. 171
During Chaney's employment at Plainfield there was a point where she
could not even render Latshaw assistance when she fell because of
Latshaw's request for only white care providers. Latshaw's behavior was
extremely problematic. Her restriction on who could render her immediate
aide during a time of need could have led to the exacerbation of an injury
or gravely affected her health. The implementation of a behavior contract
to alter Latshaw's behavior could have effectively improved Chaney and
Latshaw's relationship.
For a behavior contract to be effective, it must include statements of
responsibility from both the patient and the facility, the use of behavioral
terms, monitoring, review, utilization of a staff monitor, and a specified
time frame. 172 The behavior contract should set a goal, written with the
patient's input, describing the desired behavior and not the behavior that
168 THOMAS P. GODAR, WHYTE HIRSCHBOAEK DUDEK S.C. SPECIAL REPORT, ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS TRUMP RESIDENTS' RACIAL PREFERENCE 1, 1 (2010).
169 Ramiro Valdez, The Behavior Contract as a Positive Patient Experience, ESRD NETWORK,
http://www.esrdnetwork.org/assets/pdf/conflict/RVContractArticle-reformattedl 1-03.pdf.
170 See id. ("Appropriate and effective behavior contracts set a goal of a change in problematic
behavior."); see also SOUTHEASTERN KIDNEY COUNCIL, TO CONTRACT OR NOT To CONTRACT 1,
http://www.esrdnetwork6.org/utils/dpc/BehaviorGuidelines.pdf (discussing how behavior contracts can
be an effective way to motivate change).
171 Valdez, supra note 169; see also Tony Belak, How to Handle Difficult Behavior in the
Workplace, MEDIATE.COM, Feb. 2004, http://www.mediate.com/articles/belak4.cfin ("Difficult
behavior can inhibit performance in others and will only deteriorate if left alone.").
172 Valdez, supra note 169; see also Nursing Management ofAggression, PSYCHIATRIC NURSING,
Jan. 2011, http://nursingplanet.com/pn/nursingmanagement-aggression.html (explaining that effective
behavioral contracts require detailed information about unacceptable behaviors, acceptable behaviors,
and consequences for breaking the contract).
358
A PATIENT'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE
they wish the patient to stop.173 Not only should the contract point out the
role of the patient, but also the role the clinic will play in achieving the
desired goals. 174 It is the care facility's responsibility to "inform patients
they have the right to make suggestions for improving the clinic." 175 The
facility must set a time frame with the patient, as not doing so may make a
patient feel as if they are on "probation" and could lead to a lack of
commitment in trying to reform negative behaviors that lead to hostile
work environments. 176 A staff monitor can track the progress between the
physician and the patient, noting whether either party is keeping its end of
the agreement. 177 The contract should also notify the patient of the
consequences for non-compliance.1 78
Behavior contracts have been found to be beneficial to both the patient
and the care provider, allowing for the parties in the contract to
communicate openly with one another, addressing and discussing the
matter, and reaching a resolution that is satisfactory. 179 If a satisfactory
resolution is not reached, and the relationship between the patient and
physician becomes "irretrievabl[y] broken," a physician, along with the
facility, may choose to terminate the relationship and discharge the patient
from the care facility.'80 If the care facility and physician collectively
173 Valdez, supra note 169 ("The goal is stated as the desired behavior, NOT as the behavior to be
stopped."); see also SOUTHEASTERN KIDNEY COUNCIL, supra note 170, at 6 ("Avoid using a behavior
contract as a way to threaten or intimidate a patient, since neither will produce the long-term results
that are desired. Also, avoid wording that is negative - never degrade a patient. ").
174 Valdez, supra note 169 (explaining that in order for a behavior contract to be successful it must
state the role of both the patient and the clinic or caregiver); see also supra Part I1.A (describing
cultural competence as a means of gaining patient trust. A clinic can use cultural competency training as
their "role" in facilitating a successful behavior contract, stating that they will ensure that all of their
caregivers have cross-cultural competence, which will help caregivers maintain an understanding of
each individual patient's needs).
175 Valdez, supra note 169; see also SOUTHEASTERN KIDNEY COUNCIL, supra note 170, at 6
("Include the patient in the process. Being involved in the goal-setting process will allow a patient to
assume responsibility for a goal, and thus motivate him/her to achieve the goal. ").
176 Valdez, supra note 169; SOUTHEASTERN KIDNEY COUNCIL, supra note 170, at 7 ("All contracts
should have a clear beginning and ending date so that the patient doesn't feel as though he/she is left
hanging.").
177 Valdez, supra note 169; SOUTHEASTERN KIDNEY COUNCIL, supra note 170, at 7 ("Make sure
that all of the team's efforts and the patient's progress are recorded somewhere, and include specific
documentation in the patient's record.").
178 Jennifer L. Griffin, Addressing Problem Patient Behavior in a Physician Practice,
BIRMINGHAM MED. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.burr.com/_x734/April%202005%20BMN%20Article.pdf; SOUTHEASTERN KIDNEY
COUNCIL, supra note 170, at 6 ("Implement consequences for failure to adhere to contracts that are
meaningful to the patient, but that veer away from threatening language. ").
179 See Griffin, supra note 178; see also Valdez, supra note 169 ("Behavior contracts are being
used more and more... .").
180 Griffin, supra note 178 ("In the event the physician-patient relationship becomes irretrievably
broken, a physician may decide it is appropriate to discharge a patient from his or her practice."); see
also American Medical Association, Ending the Patient-Physician Relationship, http://www.ama-
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decide that such a drastic measure needs to be taken, the decision must be
made with great care, possibly seeking the advice of an attorney to avoid
potential claims of patient abandonment, or violations of antidiscrimination
laws or ethical guidelines.181
In cases similar to Chaney, behavior contracts would encourage the
patient to allow any nurse to care for them, regardless of the nurse's race,
culture, or religion. The contract could establish that the facility will put
forth a support system for the patient, ensuring that the patient remains
comfortable while working to overcome any fears he or she may have in
allowing an individual of another race to care for them. However, it would
be difficult to implement a rigid time frame for the contract. A facility like
Plainfield could set an agreement with the patient that the contract will
remain in place for a period of time, until the patient and care provider have
the opportunity to build a positive relationship. It is important that the
patient and the care provider get to know one another to enable the patient
to begin to trust the care provider despite their differences. A patient's
refusal to act in a manner consistent with the desired behavior expressed in
the contract would be a breach of the contract. The contract would set forth
the consequences of non-compliance, such as releasing the patient from the
facility's care. However, the contract must specifically discuss and explain
how the removal of the patient would be implemented, as to not violate the
legal and ethical obligations owed to the patient.
Behavior contracts can be a means of averting a patient's focus away
from discriminatory feelings, and instead toward obtaining the best health
care possible. Also, at a time when a patient feels as though he or she is
losing all control of their life, behavior contracts will give the patient a
measure of satisfaction, knowing that he or she does have a say in his or
her treatment, essentially reducing the power struggle between the patient
and the care provider. A behavior contract is not a legally binding contract,
but is a moral obligation on the part of both the care facility and patient that
can only work if both parties are active in initiating change.
assn.org/ama/pub/Physician-resources/legal-topics/Patient-physician-relationship-topics/ending-patient-
physician-relationship.page (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) [hereinafter AMA] (describing instances where it
may be necessary to end the patient-physician relationship).
181 Griffin, supra note 178 (noting that it can be risky to discharge a patient for non-compliance
with behavior contracts, and that to further protect the care facility and the physician, one should seek
legal advice and guidance before such measures are taken); see also AMA, supra note 180 (warning
physicians to follow appropriate steps when terminating the patient-physician relationship).
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CONCLUSION
Title VII would be rendered meaningless if the Seventh Circuit held that
a long-term care facility could grant patient preferences made on
discriminatory grounds.182 The Seventh Circuit's holding allows the United
States to continue to progress towards racial equality, rather than revert to
the days when discrimination was rampant.183 Discrimination is the
corollary of stigma, and it is evident that "[alt the heart of stigma lies fear -
fear that those who are stigmatized threaten society." 84 Both "[s]tigma and
discrimination are self-perpetuating. A stigmatized group suffers
discrimination, while discrimination underlines and reinforces stigma."' 85
These "self-perpetuating" discriminatory attitudes and beliefs cannot be
tolerated, nor afforded any preferential treatment under any circumstances,
and the Seventh Circuit properly recognized this.
Complying with a patient's wish to have a white-only care provider leads
to a hostile work environment for non-white employees.1 86 The Seventh
Circuit, reversing the lower court, "pointed out that in order to impose
liability for a racially hostile work environment, a minority [employee]
must show that the work environment was both objectively and
subjectively hostile, and that the conduct was severe and pervasive." 8 7
Any reasonable person would conclude that Chaney faced an abusive and
hostile work environment while employed at Plainfield.188 "Plainfield's
exclusion of Chaney from certain residents and work areas solely on
account of her race created a racially-charged situation that 'poisoned the
work environment' and created 'fodder' for co-workers' racially
182 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Congress' intent for not making race a BFOQ).
183 See Martin Foreman, Stigma and Discrimination, HEPATITIS & AIDS RESEARCH TRUST (Mar.
I1, 2011, 7:53 PM), http://www.heart-intl.net/HEART/Stigma/Comp/StigmaandDiscrimination.htm
("Stigma is as old as history.... but stigma remains, based on one or more factors, such as . .. class . . .
ethnicity, [and] religious belief . . .. Stigma is applied by society and borne or possessed by groups and
individuals. By defining deviance and confirming exclusion, stigma reinforces social norms .... The
corollary of stigma is discrimination."); see also OVCSupport.net, Action on Stigma and
Discrimination: What is Stigma and Discrimination, http://www.ovcsupport.net/s/index.php?i=234 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2012) ("Stigma is about beliefs and attitudes. Discrimination relates to actions. Both are
based on negative views of people simply because they are seen as belonging to a particular group.").
184 Foreman, supra note 183.
185 Foreman, supra note 183.
186 See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2010); see also John
Stone, Public Law: Seventh Circuit Finds Racially Hostile Work Environment Based on Nursing Home
Honoring Patient's Racial Preferences, NAT'L LEGAL RES. GROUP, INC. (Jan. 12, 2011, 4:04 PM),
http://www.nlrg.com/public-law-legal-research/bid/52880/PUBLIC-LAW-Seventh-Circuit-Finds-
Racially-Hostile-Work-Environment-Based-on-Nursing-Home-Honoring-Patient-s-Racial-Preferences.
187 Maria Greco Danaher, Patient's Preference Does Not Trump Duty To Abstain From Race-
Based Assignments, 12 LAW. J. 9, 9 (2010).
188 Danaher supra note 187.
2012] 361
JOURNAL OFCIVLRIGH7S&ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol.26:2
derogatory remarks."l 89
Setting precedent in this area of litigation, the Seventh Circuit asserted
that the "ethical bind" between patient preferences and Title VII
employment discrimination is avoidable when a long-term care facility is
faced with a hostile resident.190 The court made vague suggestions to long-
term care facilities that find themselves in the same position as Plainfield.
The two options suggested by the court that seem the most promising when
dealing with hostile patients, cultural competency training and behavioral
contracting, can be very successful when implemented correctly.191
The decision reached by the Seventh Circuit has brought to light the
"dilemma" that medical care facilities face when hostile patients exercise
their discriminatory preferences. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit's
opinion left a huge gray area for care facilities, forcing facilities to
determine when a specific situation promotes a hostile work environment
and what within the parameters of the law the facility can do to remedy the
situation. This Comment attempts to address the methods that a care
facility can use to ensure compliance with Title VII and OBRA 87. The
standard set forth by the Chaney court to identify the "promotion of a
hostile work environment" may have been inadequate, however, the court's
decision brought attention to these important "dilemmas." Attention to
these dilemmas of anti-discriminatory practice present society with positive
opportunities to develop policy while focusing on the emotional 'climate'
surrounding equal opportunities within organizations, which can ultimately
lead to changes in hostile patients' behavior and the manner in which this
behavior is dealt with.192
189 Danaher supra note 187.
190 See Chaney, 612 F.3d at 915.
191 See id.
192 Gunaratnam, supra note 115, at 81.
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